Much of the increase use of vertical coordinationin [he U.S. swine industry has taken place through contract production. While the incidence of contracting is much higher in nontraditional hog production areas, a growing number of Midwestern producers are being faced with contract options. A variety of contractual arrangements are available through feed companies, integrators, genetics i%-rns, and packers. However, little is known about the profitability and risk characteristics of these alternatives. This research suggests that risk neutral producers in the Midwest would prefer independent production, and risk averse producers would prefer to choose among the various types of coordination mmngements.
Pork producers have little experience or data upon which to base sound decisions about the type of production and marketing arrangement they choose, In the past, the choice wm simply to produce hogs independently and market on a hve weight basis to the highest bidder. Pork producers in the United States are now faced with decisions regarding market coordination methods that differ from traditional independent production, The majority of these akernatives can be broadly categorized as contractual arrangements, A survey of producers and contractors estimated that around 10 percent of the nation's hogs were produced under contract in 1989 (Rhodes) .
Market coordination has the potential to increase domestic pork demand by matching quantity and quality produced with consumer wants, Exports of pork may also be enhanced by incre~sed coordination, According to Uedtt, only 10 percent of Japan's pork imports come from the U.S. The lack of consistent quantities of high quality pork products at forward prices was cited as the major impediment to the growth of Japanese pork imports from the U.S.' In addition, a survey of Japanese consumers by Sapp and Knipe revealed concern about the quality of U.S. pork; only 14 percent of the respondents rated American ham and sausage high in quality, With appropriate contract specifications, processors could improve their ability to provide the volume of forward priced high quality products that the Japanese markets desire. Williamson (197 1, 1979) has suggested that transactions costs and market failures will ultimately lead to integration of successive stages of production.
At issue is what types(s) of coordination armngernents will be adopted by producers. Rhodes found that the combination of less market risk and more steady income was the most frequent reason(s) producers entered into contracts, Wilson and Eidman estimated that about 78 percent of Minnesota swine producers in their sample could be categorized as risk neutral to moderately risk averse. The objective of this paper is to examine alternative contracts of different types, The paper accomplishes the following: 1) a brief overview of contracting in U.S. livestock industries, 2) estimate the first two moments of the distributions of net returns for Midwestern hog producers under different production and working arrangements, and 3) use stochastic dominance with respect to a fwction to rank the alternatives over ranges of risk aversion.
Contract hog production in the United
States initially showed rapid growth in the nontraditional hog producing areas of the southeast and parts of the south and southwest where large scale broiler contracting had previously occurred. Contracting became more prevalent in the Midwest as the effects of the farm financial crisis of the early 1980's were felt by producers. Low profits and financial stress resulted in liquidation of swine herds, leaving behind empty facilities, Later, producers were reluctant or r.mble to invest the capital necessary to re-establish their herd because of the high level of risk and investment required.
Many of the businesses initiating contract activity in the corn belt were local feed dealerships seeking to secure their feed volume, These firms contracted the use of idle facilities and labor at low cost, More recently, some hog producers in this region have begun building new facilities exclusively for contmct production, In addition, hog finishing contracts have provided a mechanism for genetics firms to add value to barrows and nonselected gilts from rather large multiplier herds, Concerns about producer autonomy and the possibdity that contractors may seek to extract appropriable qumi rents from growers have led to proposed legislative restrictions m several states, Iowa was the first state to adopt anti-vertical integration legislation with respect to hvcstock packing firms. This legislation was amended in 1988 to prohibit contracting by packers.
According to Hamilton and Andrews, the following eight states have enacted anti-corporWe farming legislation:
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. They also point out that Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota have adopted some form of legislation regulating production contracts in agriculture. in addition, Florida and Indiana have considered legislation which would regulate contracting.
Seveml factors determine the type of production and marketing scheme that will be adopted/sustained by hog producers. The primary determinants include profivdbility, variability of profits, risk prcfcrencc, capital requirements, cash flow, equity building potential, access to technology, and any pre-existing prcfcrcnces concerning specific types of coordination alternatives.
The Rhodes survey revealed that 32 percent of contracting producers entered contracts to reduce risk and/or stabilize income, Zering and 13eals examined the financial performance of one type of finishing contract and one type of farrow-to-feeder pig contract using North Carolina data. Effects on income of such factors as marginal changes in market hog price, feeder pig price, and feed conversion variables, were noted. Kliebenstein and Hillburn examined three Iowa finishing contracts and three Parrow-to-feeder pig contracts under various non-stochastic efficiency levels. This paper exammcs the profitability of six coordirudtionalternatives currently used for finishing enterprises in the Midwest. They consist of five different types of contracts and independent production. Profitability is calculated by applying contract provisions and payments to a set of farms with finishing enterprises. Generalized Stochastic Dorninancc ((lSD) is used to rank the six alternatives under a variety of risk preferences. The risk intervals examined were delineated following the identification of Brcakcvcn Risk Aversion Coefficients (McCarl), The mnking of alternatives was examined within a geneml classification of risk attitudes, dmwing on the work by Wilson and Eidman, who mnked risk from ntmtrd to strongly averse,
Contracts, Franchises, and Independent Producers
The types of coordination armngements observed in the U.S. swine industry span the full spectrum from vertical integration to spot markets. The resource-providing contract generates the most intense controversy in the debate about the relationship betweens wine contractors and growers, Under the terms of a resource-providing finishing contract, for example, the contractor usually provides feeder pigs, feed, veterinary care, managerial assistance and all marketing functions. The grower provides buildings, equipment, utilities and labor, Growers are paid a fee per head, plus graduated bonuses for feed conversion efficiency and minimizing death loss, Why do contracts of this form appear? Schrader's 1986 article, which noted the similarity of swine production contracts and franchises, provides a starting point for the explanation, To understand the significance of this observation, it is useful to consider Ronald Cease's pioneering paper, "The Nature of the Firm," in which hc attempts to explain the existence of firms in the economy. Why do some economic actors combine themselves into firms, rather than exchanging their goods and services in the open market? Cease argues that market transactions between independent units are costly, and that the integrated firm can perform repetitive transactions at lower costs. To extend the argument, the franchise contract falls somewhere between the two extremes of the open market and the vertically integrated firm, and may be viewed as a hybrid between the firm and the market. Rubin argues that the franchiser will generally perform functions with costs that fall for a substantial level of output, while the franchisee will perform functions whose average costs generally turn up relatively soon. Just as franchisees are required to pay a substantial fee to participate in the system, hog growers are required to invest in substantial specialized facilities which have few or perhaps even no alternative uses, To a Iargc extent, franchising is used instead of vertical integration when the franchisee is physically removed from the franchiser so that monitoring the farmer's behavior and performance is difficult. Control mechanisms can be devised that give the franchisee an incentive to avoid shirking and excessive consumption of leisure, If such mechanisms can bc devised, it is possible that both the franchisee and the franchiser will gain from an enlargement of the total net returns that they share.
The study of such control mechanisms is the object of the extensive literature on the principal-agent problem, Because it is costly to monitor behavior, the principal uses process outcomes as proxies for input effort. Typically, in hog finishing contracts, these observable proxies consist of things such as feed conversion, death loss, and days to market.
Description of Coordination Alternatives
The measure of profitability calculated for each finishing scenario wm designated as returns to labor, management, and overhead (RLMOH). This is a measure of returns minus variable costs, with labor, management, and overhead representing the specific factors of production not included in variable costs.
Included in the overhead classification arc the cost of facilities and equipment, RLMOH is what is left to compensate for these unpaid flictors of production. The value RLMOH was calculated by applying the provisions of each type of contract to farm production data within each enterprise type.z This study used production data from a random sample of 17 hog farms participating in the University of Illinois FBFM record syslem.
Production records were gathered for six consecutive years, 1985-1990, A total of 953 observations were identified and the average number of hogs finished annually per farm over the six years was 1,033, Forty of the 95 observations came from farms finishing greater than 1,000 hogs in a given year, The calculation of RLMOH for each of the 95 observations was made using the data available on each FBFM record. A portion of the cost used in the calculations was estimated from the University of Illinois Livestock Budgets on a per hundred weight basis, The estimates of these nonfeed costs were held at a constant per hundred weight rate for each observation, and were later converted to a per head basis for determining RLMOH.
All of the contracts examined required that the producer provide buildings and equipment, labor, management, and nonfeed variable costs, Of the contract scenarios, numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 all pay a base payment plus bonus payments for high feed efficiency and low death loss. Contract 5 pays a base amount per head, but also stipulates that any Johnson (znd I:o.vtev. Risk Ptv/c~ence.~attd C'onmcring in the U,.S, Hog Indmlty profits or losses earned by the contractor bc split equally with the producer.
In the contract, contractor profits are defined as gross returns minus variable costs.
Contract 1 stipulates that the contractor pay the producer abase payment of$4.00 per head on arrival (payment in) and $4.50 per head after marketing (payment out). Inaddition, producers are paid bonuses based on death loss and feed efficiency. The bonus schedule for this contract is listed in table 1.
Contract 2 has abase payment of$7 per head sold, paid when the hogs arc marketed, and the bonus schedule is in table 2, Contract 3 IS another traditional base payment plus feed efficiency anddeath loss bonus contract, The base payment is $7 per head sold, paid when the hogs are marketed, and the bonus schedule for feed efficiency and death loss is identical to that of Contract 1 (table 1) .
Contract 4 also pays producers both a base amount and a bonus amount according to feed efficiency and death loss. The base payment is $7.50 per head sold, which is paid when the hogs are marketed (table 3) .
The base payment for Contract 5 is divided into two parts. The first part is $2.50 pcr head upon arrival and the second payment is $2.50 per head at marketing, However, Contract 5 differs from Contracts 1 through 4 in that the bonus payment consists of profit sharing between the producer and the contractor, Therefore, the estimates of RLMOH for Contract 5 reflect overall profitability in the hog finishing business, not Just differences in feed efticicncy and mortality rates among producers.
The shared net return 1s calculated by subtracting variable costs (feeder pig cost, feed cost, veterinary and mcdlcine, mtcrest on production inventory, and marketing expense) from the gross receipts and the profits (or Iosscs) arc shared equally between the producer and the contractor.
Several marmgerPdl assumptions were needed to make comparisons across contracts, First, hog quality was assumed to be the same across all alternatives, Specifically, the genetic variation within the sample (actual records) was assumed for all contracting scenarios. This is probably a reasonable assumption. Our experience with a number of contractors in the Midwest suggests that they use the same or similar genetics as independent producers of that region, It also appears that the production and marketing techniques used by contractors in the Midwest are not as sophisticated as those or theu counterparts in the Southeast, ConscquentIy, the second assumption is that independent management as reflected in the Illinois &ta is represermative of contract nmnagement. The third important assumption involves the health of feeder pigs as they enter the contract growing urut. Some independent finishers co-mingle pigs from multiple sources.
This practice increases the likehhood of contracting swine heaith problems. Again, our experience suggests that the local feed comparues wntmg contracts sometimes co-mingle hogs in order to fill their contracts. For the six-year period studied (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) , the mean RLMOH per head sold was highest for the independent scenario at $14.45.
The mean RLMOH for independent finishing operations is more than twice that of Contracts 1, 2, 3 and 4. The maximum value of RLMOH for independent production reveals the potential for large profits. However, the minimum values observed for the independent alternative suggests that producers could experience losses in bad years that could potentially drive the producer out of business.
The variability of returns for the independent producer (standard deviation = 10,95) is larger than for the contract alternatives. The standard deviation reveals the tremendous profit variability of independent finishing compared to contract production.
Another measure used to compare the variability of prospects with differing means and standard deviations is the coefficient of variation (CV) which is the standard deviation divided by the mean. The C'V is an indication of variability per average umt of return.
The independent scenario has six times greater variability per unit of return than Contract 1, J Agr, and Applied Econ, December, 1994 
Methodology: Generalized Stochastic Dominance
Meyer demonstrated a methodology to extend first and second degree stochastic dominance (GSD) techniques to order risky prospects while considering a distinct set of risk attitudes. This Generalized Stochastic Dominance (GSD) concept (also known as Stochastic Dominance with Respect to a Function (SDRF)) does not impose the assumption of normality on the distributions being compared as does mean-variance analysis, and does not assume a specific risk preference as do first and second degree Stochastic Dominance, Thus, GSD is more flexible in regard to the scenarios that can be compared. Stochastic Dominance has been used in a variety of agricultural settings. Dornbush and Boehlje used second order stochastic dominance to evaluate turkey production contracts in Minnesota. Other agricultural applications of Stochastic Dominance to agricultural problems include but are not limited to: Klernme; Anderson; Lee, Brown, and Lovejoy; Hardaker and Tanago; Williams; and Kramer and Pope.
For this study, GSD was used to rank market coordination alternatives based on the distribution of RLMOH across various risk attitude intervals. The class of decision makers considered in any GSD problem is designated by defining an upper and lower bound of the Arrow-Pratt function (r(x)) or risk aversion coefficients (RAC'). An individual's &l C is a measure of risk preference based on a negative exponential utility function. Generally speaking, a positive RAC implies risk 
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RAc =u''(x)/u'(x) where U(x) = -e '"
GSD ranks risky prospects from most preferred to least preferred through sequential pair wise comparisons of each prospect's expected utility. The expected utility M a product of a prospect's cumulative distribution curve and the marginal utility of a particular class of decision makers. For example, consider two prospects with probabdity density functions ,f(x) and g(x) representing cumulative distribution functions F'(x) and G(x), with x defined in the range of [0, 1]. The prospect F(x) is preferred to or indifferent to prospect G(x) by a decision maker with utility fimction U(x) if and only if:
In other words, distribution F is preferred to distribution G if-the expected utility of F exceeds that of G, Equivalently, integrating the above expression by parts yields the condition by which prospect F is preferred to G:
The class of decision makers specified or preference interval is defined as:
r-l(x) <u''(x) /u'(x) <r 2(x)
where r 1 and r2 represent lower and upper bounds on the RAC, and can range from strongly risk averse to strongly risk seeking (see Meyer) .5
Raskin and Cochran summarrze several SDRF studies and corresponding estimates of rl and r2 used in previous research, There is not a clear methodology for choosing the values of r 1 and r2 due to differing outcome variables and varying risk aversion coefficient cstlmates.
(Robison and Cochran outline how transformation effect estimates of r] and r2 when ranking alternatives different scales to transform from whole farm to per unit values of the upper and lower bounds, it is necessary to multiply the estimated bounds by the whole farm scale factor. In this case we multiplied by 1,000, the average number of hogs produced annually).
In theory, the coordination system which eventually prevails will be that which provides the desired commodity at the lowest cost. Successful contmct production depends on the availability of independently owned physical and human capital. While feed costs and feeding pig costs are the largest single costs in hog production, fixed costs are still a significant percentage of total production costs. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that current producers will have some control over the costs associated with various systems via an implicit rental market. An important aspect of this study is determining how acceptable the contract alternatives arc for producers with various degrees of risk aversion.
The location of the RAC where the rldnking of the prospects switch, named breakevcn risk aversion coefficients (BRAC) by McCarl, is of interest in order to identi~discrete risk preference intervals in which the rldnking of contmcts remains unchanged, Attempts to rank prospects using an interval that spans a 13RAC (i.e., the BRAC lies between rl and r2) will result in an inability to rank at least one pair of prospects. The goal supporting the use of this approach was to identify the largest preference intervals in which all prospects could still be ranked.
BegInning with the 95 data points from the finishing enterprise coordination alternatives, McCarl's computer algorithm wds used to identify the breakeven risk aversion coefficients where a shift of preference between two alternatives occurred,
The search technique locates the particular risk preference denoted by the ArrowPratt co-efficient, for which the difference in cxpectcd utility between some pair of prospects is zero, The procedure makes scquentid comparisons between pairs of prospects until all possible pairwise combinations have been considered. 
Generalized Stochastic Dominance Rankings of Selected Swine Production Contracts
After identifying the BRAG, the Cochran and Raskin GSD program was used to dent ify the actual ranking of each production alternative within the intervals defined by the BRAC'S. This minimizes the probability of Type I error (accidentally excluding the preferred option), but at the same time weakening the discrimination among prospects, Type H error (see Gob, Shih, Cochran, and Raskin).
The GSD program identified the coordination alternative with the highest expected utility for a specific range of risk preference. This prospect dominated all other prospects m pairwuse comparisons. The prospec~with the second highest expected utility dominated all but one prospect, and so on, down to the prospect that dominated no others but instead is dominated by all others, Consecutive risk preference intervals were ranked for each enterprise type until a wide range of risk preferences spanning from extremely nsk averse to risk neutral was considered.
In this study, GSD techniques arc implemented and discussed in the context of' both general classifications of risk preferences (risk neutral, slightly risk averse, moderately risk averse, and strongly risk averse) and within the ranges defined by the breakeven risk aversion coefficients. Most previous research has implemented only rough approximations of producer risk preferences when ranking risky prospects. Utilization of both sources of information in this study allows a broader understanding of rankings of alternative market coordination methods in the pork industry. Table 5 presents a summary of rankings of coordination alternatives in swine finishing enterprises for successive levels of nsk preference defined by the breakevcn nsk coefficients. Begmnmg at the top of the table with the most risk averse group of decision makers, Contrmt 1, which avcmges $5.47 RLMOIi per head, is the most preferred alternate,
The level of profitability coupled with the low variability of returns with Contract 1 make it the dominant distribution over the entuc range of RACS greater than .2082. With regards to Contracts 1, 2, 3, and 4, which all pay the producer a base payment plus feed efficiency/death loss bonuses, Contract 1 is most often the dominant distribution among the group, even over lower values of rl and r2 or risk neutral preferences. Contract 1 has the highest mean RLMOH of the rigid contract group, due mostly to having the highest base payment among all contracts at $8.50 pcr head, and these contracts all have small stmdard deviations.
At the opposite end of the coordination spectrum, independent operation is the least preferred alternative among strongly risk averse producers, Any attractiveness of high profitability levels is outweighed by the dislike for substantial variability. 1Iowever, as a move is made toward risk neutrahty, independence is preferred as a result of Its higher average profit potential.
Contract 5, which is a mix of base payments and profit sharing, lies somewhere between the extremes of resource providing contracts and independcmcc. In the range of slightly to moderately risk averse levels of preference, Contract 5 IS preferred or dominates, but becomes dominated by the rigid contracts in intervals of very strong risk aversion, Movement towards lower risk aversion leads to domination of Contract 5 over Contract 1 and independence. The profit sharing aspect of this contmct contributes to the higher mean RLMOH relative to other contmcts, and the steady base payment of $5.00 per head reduces some variability relative to independent production, Contract 4 IS never ranked worse than fourth and is always preferred to Contracts 2 or 3. This alternative avcmges $4.95 dollars RLMOH per head, which is close to the $5.46 ligure of Contract 1. The base payment with this contract is $7.50 per head, a dollar less than Contract 1 but the bonus schedule of Contract 5 is more lucrative than Contract 1. Contract 4 has a higher Standard Deviation because more of the payment to the -1-101
-l-tot Table 6 contains the rankings of the coordination alternatives within this set of risk aversion intervals. Roughly, these mtcrvals would correspond to the risk neutral, slight risk averse, moderately risk averse, and very risk averse producer. Notice, from tables 5 and 6, that the ranking of alternatives is the same for both risk intervals that surround zero. Furthermore, for the interval 0.1 to 0.2, Contract 5 stoehastically dominates all other contracts. Contract 1 stochastically dominates 2, 3, and 4 over all examined risk intervals in table 6, and dominates Contract 5 over the interval >1,0, These results lead to the generalization that slightly risk averse producers will prefer Contract 5, but more risk averse producers will tend to prefer Contract 1,
Concluding Remarks
If the adoption of coordination alternatives is dependent only on mean profitability, the rcstdts of this study indicate that independent production would consistent ly be the most preferred. Iiowever, the growing interest in contract production among producers indicates that average annual returns are not the only means by which coordination alternatives are measured. The frequency and magrutude of variability of returns, therefore, must also bc important.
Contracts 1, 2, 3 and 4 fit into the resource-providing category of contmcts and offer Pairly steady levels of mean RLMOH, The most risk averse group of producers, those who are strongly opposed to profit swings or who are financially unstable, will most likely prefer such alternatives, New entrants into hog production Iacklng substantial capital may also fall into this category, Among these resource providing contracts, Contract 2 is most often stochastically dominated over the various risk intervals, and Contract 1 most often dominates, The combination of a low base payment and sma[l bonuses hinder the acceptance of Contract 2. Contract 1 offers the largest base payment and the bonuses are such that variability 1s hmitcd, Contract 5 shares net returns between the contractor and producer, but the producer maintams ownership of the hogs and a large stake in production management, Contract 5 falls somewhere nearer the spot market end of the coordination spectrum, Of the contracts studied, this one appears most apt to be preferred by slightly J Agr and Apphed Econ,, Decetnher, 1994 403 risk averse producers. In addition, some of the risk inherent in independent production is passed to the contractor at a relatively low cost to the producer in terms of only slightly lower mean returns.c It would appear that alternative coordination efforts will continue to evolve in the U.S. pork industry. I-Iowever, because Wilson and Eidman found that 78 percent of Minnesota hog farmers were risk neutral or slightiy risk averse, the results in tables 5 and 6 support continued independent farmer ownership of production facilities and hogs either through traditional means or less restrictive contracts such as profit sharing or marketing arrangements with packers. In response to the demand for greater coordination along the pork marketing chain, the incidence of gmde and yield marketing has already increased substantially,'
Regardless of which mechanism is used to produce and market pork in the future, a failure to meet the demands of the domestic and export markets will be devastating to the industry. At home, consumers with unmet expectations will shift consumption from pork to other sources of protein.
Abroad, other pork producing countries have been quick to meet the demands of overseas markets. However, if a consistent quantity of quality products were in greater supply, the U.S, might be more competitive due to Iowcr production and transportation costs,
